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I. INTRODUCTION
Democracy is defined as "a system of government by the whole
population or all the eligible members of a state, typically through elected
representatives." Under this definition, South Korea is certainly
considered a democratic country, and one may have little hesitation in
praising the country as one of the few exemplary Asian states that have
achieved both remarkable economic development and dramatic political
democratization within a relatively short period of time.2 South Korea's
economy in the last half century has jumped from being one of Asia's
poorest to one of the region's leading developed countries.3 The notorious
South Korean authoritarian military regimes gave way to democratic
regimes during the 1980s and 1990s. These changes toward democracy and
a human rights protection system in the country were strongly supported by
the growth of civil society networks and people power movements.
However, it is ironic to see Park Geun-hye, the daughter of former
dictator Park Chung-hee, win the most recent South Korean presidential
election in 2012.4 Park won the election as an icon of the conservative
* Associate Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of
Hawai'i at Minoa.
This article was first presented at the He Hali'a Aloha No Jon: Memories of Aloha
for Jon Conference on February 1, 2013. I would like to thank Ms. Sherry P. Broder for her
kind invitation to the conference. I miss Professor Jon Van Dyke so much.
'Democracy Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARY, http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/
definition/american english/democracy?q=democracy (last visited May 17, 2013).
2 Southeast Asian states under the roof of ASEAN ("Association of Southeast Asian
Nations") are following South Korea's path in achieving both economic prosperity and
political democratization.
What Do You Do When You Reach the Top?, ECONOMIST (Nov. 12, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/21538104. [RB 16.6(f)].
4 See Shin Seung-keun, Park Geun-hye elected president of South Korea, THE
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ruling Saenuri party (New World Party), garnering the support of 51.55%
of the population.' In spite of her familial relationship with the former
dictator, few people believe that she would be able to change Korean
democracy into a dictatorship. However, Park is not free from her father's
legacy. She considers the economic growth and anti-communism policies
of her father as an essential part of her political identity. She has even tried
to defend her father's leadership by saying that "he made the best choice in
an unavoidable situation,"6 a statement which has been met with strong
criticism from the general public.
At this stage, it seems worthwhile for us to ask whether democracy and
human rights systems are soundly rooted in South Korean society. This
inquiry is particularly relevant because of the criticisms surrounding the
authoritarian governing style of Park's predecessor, former president Lee
Myung-bak. Is the human rights system in South Korea really sound? Can
we be assured that South Korean democracy and human rights systems will
continue in their development as they have in the last couple of decades?
Professor Louis Henkin stated that "almost all nations observe almost all
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all
of the time."9 In fact, there are many challenges for a country to apply and
implement international norms and standards in domestic settings. External
values and concepts are sometimes viewed as appealing, but the actual
transplantation of foreign norms into domestic legal soil is not free from
resistance. We often see tension between international norms and local
norms, and some of the imported norms may become discarded. The
development of norms and values in a country is not free from its internal
dynamic process, and the external or supra-national values could be
domesticated only when they pass through this filtering process. There is
HANGYEOREH (Dec 20, 2012), http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english-edition/e-national/5662
77.html.
5 Id.
6 Park Geun-Hye said during a debate organized by a journalists' association, "I think
my deceased father made the best choice in an unavoidable situation." She stressed that her
father laid the foundation of South Korea's rise from the ashes of the 1950-53 Korean War
to become Asia's fourth largest economy. See Park Geun-hye defends her father's 1961
military coup, YONHAP NEWs AGENCY (Jul. 16, 2012), http://english.yonhapnews.co.
kr/topics/2012/07/16/84/4604000000AEN20120716006800315F.HTML.
Seong Yeong-cheol and Seok Jin-whan, Park Defends Her Father's Coup as "the
Best Possible Choice," THE HANKYOREH (Jul 18, 2012), http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english
edition/e national/543077.html.
8 Ko Na-mu, Abuse of Authoritarian-era Law Rife Under Lee Administration, Says
DLP Chairwoman, THE HANKYOREH (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.hani.co.kr//arti/english
edition/e national/465868.html.
9 Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2nd ed. 1968).
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something that has to happen within the country where new values and
norms are introduced and adopted. It is important to understand the
peculiarities and the particularities that develop in this value adoption
process.10
The development of democracy and human rights systems in South
Korea is an excellent example of how international norms and values are
taking root in domestic soil." South Korea's democracy, rule of law,
constitutionalism, and the enhanced protection of human rights demonstrate
that the domestic filtering mechanisms for norm adoption are functioning
fairly well.
In terms of the adoption of international human rights norms, South
Korea has ratified most of the major human rights treaties, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),12 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR"),'3 the Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC"),14 and
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women ("CEDA W').'5 However, the ratification of the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families ("CMW") has yet to happen,16 as multi-
culturalism in Korea is in its early developmental stages. 17  Similarly
1o See TAE-UNG BAIK, EMERGING REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS IN ASIA 59-68
(2012).
1 For a general discussion on filtered universalism, see id.
12 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; see International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsgno=IV-4&chapter=4&lang-en (last visited May 28, 2013).
13 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. South Korea ratified it on Apr. 10, 1990. See
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg no=IV-3&chapter-4&la
ng-en (last visited May 27, 2013).
14 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
CRC].
15 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDA W. South Korea ratified it on Dec. 27, 1984.
See Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsg no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (last visited May, 27, 2013).
16 See International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of their Families, UNITED NATIONS TREATY SERIES,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsgno=IV-13&chapter=4&lang-en (last
visited May 27, 2013).
17 Kim Young-won, Korean Society Struggles to Embrace Multiculturalism, JAKARTA
POST (Jan 19, 2012), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/06/19/korean-society-
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Korea's accession to the Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR on death
penalty abolition is not likely to occur in the near future because of the
struggle between death penalty supporters and critics that is going on in
Korea. Human rights systems in South Korea develop with the country's
own characteristics. Human rights principles are not adopted as a replica of
foreign experience, but they develop through responding to the challenges
as they are faced.
This article argues that South Korea is consolidating its democracy and
human rights systems with its own strengths and weaknesses, and that the
human rights norms in Korea are developing through their own filtering
mechanisms, which still need continuous attention. Following this
introduction, Part II discusses the historical development of human rights
systems in Korea. Part III analyzes the current stage of political
democratization by reviewing political changes and Korean constitutional
jurisprudence. Part IV reviews the growing demands for economic
democracy and the on-going tension between conservatives and
progressives. Part V assesses the dynamics of social changes by discussing
the efforts to abolish the death penalty along with the resistance from the
retentionist camps, which lead to a conclusion that South Korea still needs
to put forth greater efforts to consolidate democracy and human rights.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS IN SOUTH KOREA
The history of constitutional documents on the Korean peninsula may
date back to either the Gyunggukdaejeon from the Chosun Dynasty or the
Taehankukje that was adopted in 1899 under the Korean Empire, in the last
days of Chosun.18 After the liberation in 1945, Korea was divided into two,
the North and the South. While North Korea became a socialist state, South
Korea adopted a rather liberal constitution, influenced by the German
Weimar Constitution.19 However, for a long time, the rights established by
this constitution were rendered meaningless by dictatorial regimes.20 Law
struggles-embrace-multiculturalism.html.
18 Taehankukie was the constitutional document to set up a constitutional monarchy at
the end of Chosun dynasty by Emperor Gojong.
19 BAIK, supra note 10, at 118.
20 The authoritarian regimes generally emphasized national sovereignty, economic
development and anti-communism. Thomas P. Kim, The Second Opening of Korea: U.S.-
South Korean Free Trade Agreement, KOREA POLICY INSTITUTE (Jun. 14, 2007),
http:www.kpolicy.org/documents/policy/070614thomaskimsecondopening.html. Therefore,
the constitutional rights provisions existed in earlier versions of the constitution, but they
were not read seriously as guarantors of the rights of the people. Cf BAIK, supra note 10, at
118 ("The Constitution of 1987 transformed the declaratory constitution, which had only
been an ornament under the military dictatorship, into a meaningful document which can be
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was a mere tool for the government to justify its illegitimate governance. In
1970, a labor activist named Jeon Tae-II shouted out, while self-immolating
on the street, "Abide by the Labor Standards Laws! We are not
machines!"21 It was the first occasion when the rights sanctioned in the
constitution and its accompanying legal statutes were seriously claimed in
the process of social movements.22 After the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, Korea's history of real constitutionalism began. From
externally imposed norms, the perception of the constitution changed and it
began to be seen as a guarantee of human rights for the Korean people.23
When the constitution was first adopted in South Korea in 1948, the
expression, "human rights" did not appear.2 4 In a year where much of the
25
world was adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Korea
was separate, and not a party to this movement. In contrast, the constitution
of Japan has emphasized human rights since its adoption in 1947,26 boasting
its progressive characteristics adopted under the auspices of the US Military
Government after WWII. 27 It was only after Korea's 1962 Constitution that
the South Korean National Assembly began to use the term "human rights"
in the constitution. 28 Article 8 of the 1962 Constitution provided that: "All
citizens shall be assured of human dignity and worth and it shall be the duty
of the State to guarantee to the greatest extent the fundamental human
rights of individuals."2 9
The provision still shows some limitations to the protection of human
rights by using the expression, "to the greatest extent." 3 0 This limitation
was removed in the 1980 Constitution.31 Article 9 of the 1980 Constitution
used to protect rights."). International humanitarian laws such as Geneva Conventions and
Hague Conventions were invoked during the Korean War in 1950-53, but they did not
contribute much to the development of human rights in South Korea. BAIK, supra note 10 at
118-121.
21 HAGEN Koo, KOREAN WORKERS: THE CULTURE AND POLITICS OF CLASS FORMATION
70(2001).
22 Id. at 127.
23 See BAIK, supra note 10, at 119-120.
24 1948 DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB][CONSTITUTION] (July 17, 1948) (S.
Kor.).
25 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (1II) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(111) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
26 NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO]I[CONSTITUTION] (Japan).
27 Id. arts. 11 & 97.
28 1962 DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB][CONSTITUTION] (Dec. 26, 1962) (S.
Kor.).
29 Id. art. 8, no. 6 (emphasis added) (translation provided by the author).
30 id.
31 Compare 1962 DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB][CONSTITUTION] (Dec. 26,
1962) (S. Kor.) with 1980 DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB][CONSTITUTION] (Oct. 27,
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and Article 10 of current 1987 Constitution states that: "All citizens shall
be assured of human dignity and worth and have the right to pursue
happiness. It shall be the duty of the State to confirm and guarantee the
fundamental and inviolable human rights of individuals."32 This provision
expanded the scope of human rights by acknowledging the right to pursue
happiness, and also made it clear that the state bears the duty to confirm the
inviolability of human rights. These changes demonstrate that the
democracy movements in the 1970s and 1980s were not merely pursuing
procedural democracy in the form of the election system, but they also
wanted to achieve substantive democracy, which included the agenda of
promoting substantive human rights.
When the Jimmy Carter administration campaigned for human rights
diplomacy in the 1970s, these policies did not excite human rights activists
in Korea. These activists thought that human rights without democracy
was insufficient. Their skepticism of this approach to human rights grew,
particularly when the Carter administration turned a blind-eye to General
Chun Doo-hwan's military coup in 1979-80, and when Chun moved the
marine forces from the De-Militarized Zone ("DMZ") to Gwangju to
suppress the Gwangju Democracy Movement.34 Because, at that time, the
armed forces were under the direct control of US Commanders, some civil
society groups still allege that the U.S. is jointly responsible for the May
1980 massacre in Gwangu.35 These criticisms increased when Ronald
Reagan warmly embraced General Chun, who was specially invited to the
White House, soon after Chun assumed presidential power in South
Korea.36
The introduction of international human rights norms and values in South
Korea was largely conducted by the NGOs such as the Lawyers for a
1980) (S. Kor.).
32 1980 DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB][CONSTITUTION] art. 9 (Oct. 27, 1980) (S.
Kor.) (emphasis added) (translation provided by the author).
33 Cf Tim Shorrock, The Struggle for Democracy in South Korea in the 1980s and the
Rise ofAnti-Americanism, 8 THID WORLD QUARTERLY 1195 (Oct. 1986).
34 David Adesnik & Sunhyuk Kim, If at First You Don't Succeed: The Puzzle of South
Korea's Democratic Transition, CENTER ON DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE RULE OF
LAW, STANFORD (July 2008), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22209/No_83
AdesKimSouthKorea.pdf.
3 Tim Shorrock, The Kwang/u Uprising and US-Sanctioned Massacre, KASAMA
PROJECT (Jun. 17, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://kasamaproject.org/history/2360-92the-kangju-
uprising-and-US-sanctioned-massacre.
36 Hamesh McDonald, Reagan's Backing for Chun Worries Seoul's Dissidents, SYDNEY
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Democratic Society (Minbyun), the People's Solidarity for Participatory
Democracy (PSPD), and Sarangbang Human Rights Group.37 Through the
civil societies' vigorous activities, human rights became popularly
supported in Korea.
A country's human rights norms are found in several forms. One of the
most important methods of adopting human rights norms is the ratification
of international human rights treaties. Under the South Korean Constitution
article 6, "treaties duly concluded and promulgated under the Constitution
and generally recognized rules of international law shall have the same
force and effect of law as domestic laws of the Republic of Korea." 39 South
Korea has ratified or acceded to seven of the United Nation's nine major
human rights treaties, including the ICCPR,40 and the ICESCR.41 The First
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which allows individual communication to
the Human Rights Committee, was also ratified.42 While Korea has ratified
seven of these treaties, Japan ratified six and China has ratified five.43
South Korea's ratio of ratification of human rights treaties is on par with
other developed countries in the region.
37 LAW AND SOCIETY IN KOREA 132 (Hyunah Yang ed., 2013).
38 id
3 DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEO1BJ [CONSTITUTION] art. 6 (S. Kor.).
40 ICCPR, supra note 12.
41 ICESCR, supra note 13.
42 See infra Table 1.
43 See infra note 46.
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Table 1: Human Rights Treaty Ratification by South Korea as of201344
State party ICESCR ICCPR OPTI OPT2 CERD CEDAW CAT CRC CMW No. of
ICCPR ICCPR treaties
1966/ 1966/ 1966/ 1989/ 1966/ 1979/ 1984/ 1989/ 1990 1990/
1976 1976 1976 1991 1969 1981 1987 2003
Republic of 1990 1990 1990 1979 1985 1995 1991 7
Korea
Reservations 22 16(1)(g) 21(a), 40(2)
(b)(v)
Interestingly, in South Korea, the ratification of human rights treaties has
been closely related to the development of democracy. Five out of the
seven ratified treaties were ratified in the 1990s, only after South Korea's
democratization.4 5
South Korea still receives criticism for certain reservations it made
concerning several provisions of the human rights treaties. South Korea
originally declared that Article 14 (5) & (7) on the right to appeal and
Article 22 on the right to freedom of association of the ICCPR would not be
4 ICCPR, supra note 12 (ratified by ROK and Japan and signed by China); ICESCR,
supra note 13 (ratified by China, Japan, and ROK); Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-
5&chapter=4&lang-en (last visited May 28, 2013) (ratified by ROK and Taiwan but not by
China or Japan) [hereinafter First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR]; Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg no=IV-12&cha
pter=4&lang-en (last visited May 28, 2013) (ratified by none); International Convention on
the Elimination of All Types of Racial Discrimination, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsgno=IV-2&chapter=4&la
ng-en (last visited May 28, 2013) (ratified by all); CEDA W, supra note 15 (ratified by all);
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties. un.org/Pages/ViewDe
tails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited May, 28, 2013)
(ratified by all) [hereinafter CA T]; Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/
viewdetails.aspx?src-treaty&mtdsgno=iv-ll&chapter=4&lang-en (last visited May 28,
2013) (ratified by all) [hereinafter CRC]; International Convention on the Protection ofthe
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties. un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&
lang-en (last visited May 28, 2013) (ratified by none).
45 ICCPR, supra note 12; ICESCR, supra note 13; First Optional Protocol of the
ICCPR, supra note 44; CRC, supra note 44; CAT, supra note 44.
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binding over the country.46 It has withdrawn its reservations on Article
14(5) & (7) concerning the special criminal procedure under Social
Protection Act in 2006,47 but no action has been taken concerning Article
22 on the right to freedom of association because the State Public Officials
Act prohibits public servants from participating in trade union activities.48
With regard to the Convention on the Rights of Child, the government
holds reservations about paragraph (a) of Article 21, and sub-paragraph (b)
(v) of paragraph 2 of Article 40.49 Korea declared CEDAW Article 9 and
Article 16(1) (c),(d),(f) & (g) not binding concerning women's equal
rights.so CEDAW had strongly recommended that the reservation of Article
46 ICCPR, supra note 14.
47 id.
48 Article 66, GUKKA GONGMUWEONBEOP [The State Public Officials Act], Act No.
11489, Oct 22, 2012 (S. Kor.); see also Comments by the Republic of Korea on the
concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Republic of Korea (2000),
CCPR/C/79/Add.122, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/O/lf3186f9f8a651148
02568ef003766a5?Opendocument (last visited May 28, 2013).
49 CRC, supra note 14, art. 9 § 3 ("States Parties shall respect the right of the child who
is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with
both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best interests.").
Article 21 notes that:
States Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure that the
best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration and they shall:
(a) Ensure that the adoption of a child is authorized only by competent authorities who
determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures and on the basis of all
pertinent and reliable information, that the adoption is permissible in view of the
child's status concerning parents, relatives and legal guardians and that, if required, the
persons concerned have given their informed consent to the adoption on the basis of
such counseling as may be necessary[.]
Article 40 § 2 states:
2. To this end, and having regard to the relevant provisions of international
instruments, States Parties shall, in particular, ensure that:
(b) Every child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law has at least the
following guarantees:
(v) If considered to have infringed the penal law, to have this decision and any
measures imposed in consequence thereof reviewed by a higher competent,
independent and impartial authority or judicial body according to law[.]
Id.
so CEDA WArticle 9 § 1 states:
1. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain
their nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor
change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the
nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the
husband.
2. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the
nationality of their children.
Article 16 § 1 states:
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16 is incompatible with the Convention and therefore impermissible.5
Fortunately, Korea withdrew its reservations on Article 9 & 16(1) (c),(d)
&(f), sections related to discrimination, 52 but the reservation on Article
16(1)(g) of CEDAW on the right to choose a family name has not yet been
withdrawn.53
Since recommendations from human rights bodies concerning state
reports or individual communications are not binding, they are often
neglected or ignored by the states. The South Korean government is not
fully recognizing the recommendations made by the Human Rights
Committee on the National Security Act54 and those of the CEDAW
Committee on the discrimination against women, but, as stated above, it is
making slow progress in selectively following some of the
recommendations.
South Korea was also slow in responding to demands to adopt the
National Action Plan for the Protection of Human Rights. Adopting the
National Action Plan has become an important obligation of the State after
the world endorsed the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights in 1993. *
South Korea finally began the process of adopting the National Action Plan
recommended by its National Human Rights Commission in 2006, and it
finally adopted the National Action Plan for 2007-2011 on May 22, 2007.
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a
family name, a profession and an occupation;
CEDAW, supra note 15.
5' Comm. On the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rep. on its 18th &
19th Sess., Jan. 19- Feb. 6, 1998 & June 22-July 10, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/53/38/Rev. 1,
GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1998).
52 See CEDA W, supra note 15.
53Id.
54 The National Security Law: Curtailing Freedom of Expression and Association in the
Name of Security in the Republic of Korea, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2012),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA25/006/2012/en/d3eb6ce2-ab8c-4479-a0 12-
62744223457e/asa250062012en.pdf.
5 See CEDA W, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, supra note 15.
56 National Plans ofAction for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/Issues/PlansActions/Pages/PlansofActionlndex.aspx (last visited May 28, 2013).
57 See Summary of the National Action Plan for the Promotion and Protection ofHuman
Rights of the Republic of Korea, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/NHRA/Korea-SummaryNHRAP.
doc (last visited May 28, 2013).
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Another important question is whether the international norms are
justiciable in domestic legal systems.58 South Korean courts are reluctant to
prioritize international treaties over domestic law if they are in conflict with
local law, and they tend to avoid relying solely on international legal
authority.5 9 International norms have persuasive influence over Korean
society, but justiciability of international law is still in its early development
in Korea. Customary international law is treated as part of international
law, but its application in domestic court is unlikely when international
custom is the only legal source.o International norms are generally
considered through the constitution or other domestic statutes in Korea.61
The U.N. Human Rights Council recently conducted the second universal
periodic review on the South Korean human rights situation on October 25,
2012. The Troika Working group 6 2 of the Human Rights Council (Djibouti,
Hungary, and Indonesia), after appreciating the efforts that South Korea has
made to enhance human rights protections, recommended a number of
measures for a greater protection of human rights, which include:
Enhancing protection against domestic violence and enhancing rehabilitation
of victims . .. Protection from discrimination and legal recourse for victims of
discrimination and adoption of the Anti-Discrimination Act as a matter of
priority; Imposing an official moratorium on the death penalty and
strengthening measures against torture and ill-treatment; Amending the
National Security Law to prevent its arbitrary application and abusive
interpretation; Ensuring the right to conscientious objection to military service
and ensuring alternative military service options; Guaranteeing freedom of
expression, including on the Internet, and freedom of assembly; Promoting
local integration of refugees and asylum seekers and guaranteeing the full
enjoyment of human rights of migrant workers ....
58 See Gyeongsu Jeong, Gukjae Ingweonbeopeui Guknae Jeokyonge Gwanhan
Bipanjeok Bunseok: Hangukeui Gukgagwanhaengeul Daesangeuro [Critical Analysis of the
Domestic application of international human rights law: Focusing on the Korean Practice],
8 HANGUK HUNBEOP HAKHOE, Dec. 2002, at 12-14.
' Id. at 12.
60 Id.
61 See, e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 93Dol71 1, Dec. 24, 1993 (S. Kor.) (deciding on
violations of NSA); see also Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 98 Du16620, Jan 26, 1999 (S. Kor.)
(deciding on the cancellation of Social Security Supervision measure).
62 The troikas are a group of three States selected through a drawing of lots who serve as
rapporteurs and who are charged with preparing the report of the Working Group on the
country review with the involvement of the State under review and assistance from the
OHCHR. See Universal Periodic Review-Media Brief OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
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The tone of the report written by the working group is moderate,6 but the
report demonstrates that some of the South Korean human rights practices
are still under scrutiny. Since the conservative party (known as the Grand
National Party, or Hannaradang, the predecessor of President Park's
Saenuri Party) candidate Lee Myung-bak's presidency in 2008, the
democratic atmosphere in South Korea has encountered serious challenges.
Strong concerns have been raised with regard to the freedoms of
expression, association and religion.65 International intellectuals have even
warned the government of the possibility of regression from democracy to
- 66authoritarianism in Korea. Intelligence agencies resumed monitoring
domestic NGOs' activities, thus breaking the new tradition of freedom for
civil society organizations under the liberal Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-
hyun regimes (1998-2007). Civic organizations and individuals were
being targeted by the law enforcement agencies for unclear reasons, and
former president, Roh Moo-hyun shockingly killed himself by throwing his
body down a cliff when allegations of corruption were made against his
family members. The Lee government also refused to cooperate with
international human rights institutions. For example, Mr. Frank La Rue, the
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, visited South Korea,
but he was not allowed to meet the president. The head of the National
Human Rights Commission of Korea also refused to meet the Special
Rapporteur.69 Amnesty International expressed serious concerns on the
weakening freedom of expression in Korea after a researcher visited Seoul
to report on human rights conditions in 2010.70
64 Contrast the difference in the reports on North Korea. UN Human Rights Council,
Human Rights Council adopts outcomes of Universal Periodic Review on Bhutan, Dominica
and DPRK, RELIEFWEB (Mar. 18, 2010), http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-
republic-korea/human-rights-council-adopts-outcomes-universal-periodic.
65 Freedom on the Net: South Korea, FREEDOM HOUSE, http://www.freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-net/2012/south-korea (last visited May 28, 2013).
66 South Korea: Statement from Professors in North America Concerned about Korean
Democracy, ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (June 10, 2009), http://www.humantights.
asia/news/forwarded-news/AHRC-FS-049-2009.
67 Civic leader objects to NIS's surveillance of civil society, THE HANKYOREH (June 19,
2009), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english.edition/e-national/361300.html.
68 Justin McCurry, Former South Korea President Leaps to Death in Ravine, THE
GuARDIAN (May 23, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/24/south-korea-
former-president-suicide.
69 See Son Jun-hyun, U.N rapporteur reports freedom of expression severely curtailed
under Lee administration, THE HANKYOREH (Feb. 17, 2011), http://english.hani.co.
kr/arti/english edition/e national/463878.html.
70 South Korea-Amnesty International Report 2010: Human Rights in Republic of
Korea, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/south-korea/report-
2010 (last visited May 28, 2013).
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This development has been an unexpected regression, especially since
Korean human rights systems have been considered quite strong after the
democratization in 1980s and 1990s, particularly under the liberal Kim
Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun governments, which actively promoted
human rights. The newly inaugurated Park Geun-hye government may try
to differentiate itself from Lee Myong-bak's government, but it is still not
very clear whether Korea will go ahead toward the consolidation of
democracy and human rights, or whether it will experience some stagnation
in human rights protection.
III. SOUTH KOREA'S POLITICAL CHANGES
AND THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRACY
The presidential election campaign in December 2012 was a tight race,
and it was a good illustration of the current state of South Korean
democracy. Park Geun-hye, the ruling party's candidate was the favorite
leading up to the election, but she had two main challengers, Moon Jae-in
and Ahn Chul-soo. Moon was the former Secretary General to President
Roh Moo-Hyun and the nominee of the main opposition party.71
Independent candidate Ain was a professor at Seoul National University
and venture businessman, who was widely supported by Korea's younger
generation.72 Both Moon and Ahn's camps, realizing that their chances for
winning the election were diminished by the presence of the other, decided
to form a coalition. Eventually Moon was selected to be their candidate
against Park. This would be unremarkable, if not for the fact that they
ended up choosing the less popular candidate, Moon. Because they could
not reach a negotiated agreement, Ahn voluntarily resigned, after
expressing his unenthusiastic support for Moon.73 In polls conducted where
only two candidates were listed, Aim Chul-soo was actually favored in a
head-to-head election against Park Geun-hye, while in a poll pitting Park
against Moon Jae-in, Moon was about seven percentage points behind in
the polls. 74 Ultimately Park Geun-hye won 51.55% of the electorate to
Moon's 48.02% .
71 Seong Han-yong, Moon Jae-in's Leadership in Depth, THE HANKYOREH (Dec. 7,
2012), http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/englishedition/e-national/564273.html.
72 Evan Ramstad, Ahn Decides When He'll Decide, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept.
11, 2012, 7:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2012/09/1 /ahn-decides-when-hell-
decide.
7 Choe Sang-hun, South Korea is Surprised by Departure of Candidate, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/24/world/asia/ahn-cheol-soo-unexpect
edly-quits-south-koreas-presidential-race.html?_r-0.
74 Park Geun-hye Currently Leading Moon Jae-in In National Polls, ROK DROP (Dec.
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Park Geun-hye's father, Park Chung-hee, came into power by a military
coup in May 1961, and subsequently assumed the presidency in 1963. The
constitution underwent revisions under the Park regime to give him greater
powers, and to allow him to be reelected beyond the constitutional term-
limits. 76 He was subject to heavy criticism for human rights violations and
his disregard of the constitutional rights and democratic ideals, and he was
assassinated by Kim Jae-kyu, one of his own confidantes in 1979.n
The end of the Park Chung-hee regime was followed by another military
coup in 1979. Chun Doo-hwan (1981-1988) and Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993)
assumed presidency one by one after the massacre of Gwangju citizens in
1980. Chun and Roh's authoritarian regimes faced strong demand for
democracy, and this procession of military regimes finally ended with the
election of civilian president Kim Young-sam. Eventually, Chun Doo-
hwan and Roh Tae-woo were arrested in 1995 for charges stemming from
their military rebellions in 1979-80 and acts of corruption.7 8 In March 1996
their public trial began. Chun was charged with leading an insurrection,
conspiracy to commit insurrection, murder for the purpose of rebellion, and
assorted crimes relating to bribery. 79 Roh Tae-woo was alleged to have
received bribes from many corporate executives, including Kim Woo-
choong, chairman of Daewoo Corp, who was accused of paying Roh a total
of $31 million on seven occasions from 1988 to 1991, including a $6.5
million bribe to win a contract to build a submarine base near the
southeastern port of Busan.80 Both Chun and Roh were found guilty and in
8, 2012, 1:57 AM), http://rokdrop.com/2012/12/08/park-geun-hye-currently-leading-moon-
jae-in-in-national-polls/; Rick Gladstone & Su-Hyun Lee, New Voice in South Korean
Politics Enters Presidential Race, N.Y. TIMES (Sept 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/09/20/world/asia/new-voice-in-south-korean-politics-enters-presidential-
race.html.
7s REPUBLIC OF KOREAN CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION, http://info.nec.go.kr/
electioninfo/electionlnfo report.xhtml?electionld=0020121219&requestURI=%2Felectionin
fo%2F0020121219%2Fvc%2FvccpO9.jsp&topMenuld=VC&secondMenuld=VCCP&menul
d=VCCP09&statementId=VCCPO9 %23 1 &electionCode= 1 &cityCode=0&sggCityCode=0
&x=31&y-7 (last visited May 28, 2013).
76 Donald Gregg, Park Chung Hee, TIME (Aug. 23, 1999), http://www.time.com/time/
world/article/0,8599,2054405,00.html.
n Michael Breen, Assassination of President Park Chung-Hee in 1979, KOREAN TIMES
(Oct. 24, 2010, 4:58 PM), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2012/09/178_
751 00.html.
78 Michael Breen, Chun Doo-hwan: Last Dictator, KOREAN TIMES (Nov. 23, 2011, 7:26
PM), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/issues/2013/05/363_99434.html.
7 Sheryl WuDunn, Condemned in South Korea, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 1, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/01/weekinreview/condened-in-south-korea.html.
80 Teresa Watanabe, South Korean Ex-President Arrested: Corruption: Roe Tae Woo is
Jailed on Charges of Taking More than $300 Million, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1995),
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1997 were respectively sentenced to life imprisonment and a seventeen-
year prison term.8' President Kim Young-sam pardoned the prison
sentences for both Chun and Roh in that same year.82 Chun is still required
to pay his massive fine and an additional monetary penalty related to his
crimes, but he claims to have only 250,000 won (approximately $200) to
his name. To this day, the outstanding fines have not been collected.83
Along with these changes, South Korea gradually moved toward
democracy and constitutionalism. 84 The civilian presidents Kim Young-
sam (1993-1998), Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2003), and Roh Moo-Hyun (2003-
2008) have each contributed to the development of a fully functioning
democracy. This democratization process has also strengthened and
rejuvenated the civil and political rights provisions in the constitution, and
the constitution has gained greater legal authority. The overbroad and
obscure human rights restricting clauses that were greatly abused under the
authoritarian regimes have since been amended.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Constitutional Court of South Korea
was established, and this court has played a significant role in consolidating
democracy, human rights, and constitutionalism. 86  The South Korean
Constitutional Court consists of nine Justices, who serve for six-year
renewable terms: three of the Justices are nominated by the President, three
by the National Assembly, and three by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.87 The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court includes: ruling on
http://articles.1atimes.com/1995-11-17/news/mn-4124_1_roh-tae-woo.
81 See GEORGE N. KATSIAFICAS, ASIA'S UNKNOWN UPRISINGS VOLUME 1: SOUTH
KOREAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 364-65 (2012); see also Andrew
Pollack, Seoul Court Upholds Sentences on 2 Ex-Presidents, N.Y. TIMES (April 18, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/18/world/seoul-court-upholds-sentences-on-2-ex-
presidents.html?ref-rohtaewoo.
82 Andrew Pollack, 2 Ex-Dictators Leave Korea Jails, Pardoned After 2 Years, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 23, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/23/world/2-ex-dictators-leave-
korea-jails-pardoned-after-2-years.html?ref-rohtaewoo.
83 KATSIAFICAS,supra note 81, at 364-65.
8 See generally CARL J. SAXER, FROM TRANSITION TO POWER ALTERNATION:
DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH KOREA, 1987-1997 (2002).
85 For example, Article 37 (2) of the 1987 Constitution was amended to reduce the
restriction of constitutional rights as follows: "Freedoms and rights of citizens may be
restricted by Act only when necessary for national security, maintenance of law and order or
for public welfare. Even when such restriction is imposed, essential aspects of the freedom
or right shall not be violated." DAEHANMINKUK HUNEBOB [HUNEBOB][CONSTITUTION] art.
37(2) (S. Kor.) (emphasis added).
16 See Dae-Kyu Yoon, The Constitutional Court System of Korea: The New Road for
Constitutional Adjudication, 1 J. OF KOR. L. 1 (2001); see generally Jin-Su Yune, Recent
Decisions of the Korean Constitutional Court on Family Law, 1 J. OF KOR. L. 133 (2001).
8 Dae-Kyu Yoon, supra note 86, at 7.
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the constitutionality of laws; ruling on competence disputes between
governmental entities; giving final decisions on impeachments; making
judgments on dissolution of political parties; and adjudicating constitutional
petitions filed by individuals. 8 The Constitutional Court has been a
meaningful intermediary and coordinator among different forces in Korean
society by responding to the demands from social movements in the private
sector, the legislative power of the National Assembly, and judiciary
bodies. The Constitutional Court's decisions were considered as careful
responses to the demands for social changes.
A good example of the Court's prominent role was the impeachment
proceeding concerning then-President Roh Moo-hyun in 2004.90 In March
2004, the majority opposition parties (the Grand National Party ("GNP")
and the New Millennium Democratic Party ("NMDP")) jointly introduced a
motion for the impeachment of President Roh Moo-hyun for three
charges-alleged violation of the Election Act, illegal election funds
received by his staff, and jeopardizing the economy as a political move to
win the imminent election.9' Surprisingly, however, the impeachment bill
passed (193 to 2) and the president was forced to stop his official duties
while the Constitutional Court decided whether he should be removed from
his public office.92 While hundreds of thousands of protesters demonstrated
against the illegitimate impeachment action, President Roh did not attempt
to take any unusual emergency measures, and the Constitutional Court
decided on May 14th, 2004, that the violations did not meet the required
threshold for impeachment.93 This impeachment case is a good indication
that the Korean democracy is secure to the point where a coup or other
illegitimate exercise of power is unlikely,94 and that South Korea is now a
really democratic regime.
Another prominent example of the Constitutional Court's role was shown
in a lawsuit concerning discriminatory provisions in the Civil Code.95
Article 809(1) of the Civil Act prohibited marriage between two persons
88 HUNBEOPJAEPANSOBEOP [Constitutional Court Act], Act. No. 105A6, Apr. 5, 2011,
art. 2 (S. Kor.), available at english.ccourt.go.kr/home/attfile/download/constitutional
courtact.pdf.
89 See Tae-Ung Baik, Public Interest Litigation in South Korea, in PUBLIC INTEREST
LITIGATION IN ASIA 115 (Po Jen Yap & Holning Lau eds., 2011).
90 Id at 122-23.
9' Id. at 122-23.
92 id
93 See Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2004Hun-nal, May 14, 2004 (S. Kor.); see
alsoYoungjae Lee, Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Impeachment of Roh Moo-Hyun
from A Comparative Constitutional Perspective, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 403 (2005).
94 Baik, supra note 89, at 124.
9 Id at 123.
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having the same family name with the same ancestral line. The Seoul
Family Court, after accepting the plaintiffs' complaints, suspended the case
and referred the constitutionality issue to the Constitutional Court on May
29, 1995.96 In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that Article 809(1) of the Civil
Code was incompatible with the Constitution Article 10 right to pursue
happiness, and that if the National Assembly did not amend it by December
31, 1998, it would become null and void, starting on January 1, 1999.97 It
took several years before the law was amended after the Court's decision.
The Civil Code was finally amended on March 31, 2005 to remove the
discriminatory provisions and incorporate the Constitutional Court's
decision.98 These developments demonstrate significant changes in South
Korean society: people now try to use the Court as an institution to pursue
social changes, rather than relying on demonstrations or other direct appeals
to the government.99
In the same vein, regular courts are also used for public interest
litigation.100 For example, there was an interesting lawsuit called the
"salamander lawsuit," which was filed in October 2003 by a group of
plaintiffs, including the salamanders living in Mt. Cheonseong, the
Buddhist nun Jiyul, some environmentalists, and a society called the
Friends of Salamanders.'o' They requested that the construction of express
railroad tracks by the Korea Rail Network Authority be discontinued, and
invoked constitutional rights such as Article 35(1) of the Constitution on
the right to environment or the right to defend nature and the provisions of
relevant statutes such as the Framework Act on Environment Policy.10 2 The
court determined that the salamanders did not have standing, since nature
does not have standing in a court, but the court proceeded with other
plaintiffs. Eventually the case was dismissed, but the publicity from this
case has greatly contributed to environmental awareness in Korea.10 3 The
public is now more accepting of the idea that the court proceedings can be a
meaningful process to pursue their rights.1"4 This is a very important shift
96 See Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 95Hun-ka6, July 16, 1997 (S. Kor.).
9 Id.
98 235 votes out of 296 N.A. seats; 161 for the amendment, 58 against it, and 16
abstained from voting on March 2, 2005. Minbeob [Civil Code], Act No. 7427, Mar. 2,
2005 (S. Kor.) Gukhoi 'Hojuje Pyeji' Minbeopgaejeongan Gagyeol [National Assembly
Abolishes Head of Household System by Passing the Civil Code Amendments], Donga Ilbo,
(Mar. 2, 2005, 5:41PM), available at http://news.donga.com/3/all/20050302/8164924/1.
99 Baik, supra note 89, at 115.
00 Id. at 125-27.
101 Id. at 115-16.
102 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2004Dall48 & 1149, June 2, 2006 (S. Kor.).
103 See Baik, supra note 89, at 125.
14 Id. at 126.
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of the legal consciousness of the people because traditionally, law and legal
process have not been viewed in such a positive way. There has been a lack
of a law-abiding spirit and consciousness of rights in Korea,105 but now
Korea is achieving a smooth transition from authoritarian regimes to
democracy with an increased role for the courts. 06
Another important move that Korean democratic governments have taken
is the promotion of transitional justice measures to correct the wrongdoings
of the past.107  The Korean transition from military dictatorship to
democracy was not, from an international perspective, an isolated case, but
Korean democratic governments were especially active in providing
remedy measures to victims of past human rights violations.'08 As many as
eighteen truth commissions have been established since 1996 to deal with
the historical legacies of Korea's authoritarian and colonial past,109 and the
government has worked closely with civil society to provide remedial
measures to these victims to achieve justice in the transition from
authoritarian regimes to a democracy.'10
All of these changes-democratization, the development of the rule of
laws, constitutionalism and human rights protection systems-were
possible because there were powerful civil society networks and combatant
labor movement organizations in Korea, which demanded and supported
the changes."' However, it is hard to say that Korean democratization is
complete. There are still some challenges to overcome. Among others, the
emergence of combatant ultra-rightist groups in society is one of the new
phenomena.1 12  Traditionally, there were government-sponsored ultra-
105 Sang-Hyun Song, Korean Attitude Toward Law, in KOREAN LAW IN THE GLOBAL
EcoNoMY 129 (Sang-Hyun Song ed., 1996).
106 There are still demands for a change in the strict procedural requirements in public
interest litigation or the expansion of class action systems. Baik, supra note 91, at 126.
107 For more information, see Hahm Chaihark, Human Rights in Korea, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN ASIA 265 (Peerenboom et. al. eds., 2006).
108 Baik, supra note 89, at 126.
109 See Byung-Wook Ahn, Hanguk Guageo Cheongsaneui Hyeonhuanggua Guajeh [The
Present Conditions and Tasks ofPast Settlement in Korea], 93 YEOKSA BIPYEONG 32, 45-46
(2010).
110 See generally Kim Dong-choon & Mark Selden, South Korea's Embattled Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, THE ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL: JAPAN Focus (Mar. 1, 2010),
http://www.japanfocus.org/-kim-dongchoon/3313.
111 See generally Gi-Wook Shin et al., South Korea's Democracy Movement (1970-
1993): Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report (2007), available at iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/22590/kdp report (final)-1.pdf; Shaping Change-Strategies of
Development and Transformation: South Korea, BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG,
bti2006.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/132.0.html?L=1 (last visited May 29, 2013)
[hereinafter Shaping Change].
112 Shaping Change, supra note 111.
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conservative groups in Korea such as the Korea Freedom Federation,"
Korean War Veterans Association,114 and the Korean Marine Corps
Veterans Association."" Their actual influence over the public was rather
limited under the authoritarian regimes. However, in recent years, more
aggressive activities and accusatory rhetoric such as Bbalgaengi (the reds)
and Jongbukseryuk (the pro-North Korean) are being found among the
rightist or new-right groups."'6  The ultra-rightist conservatives have
strongly expressed their animosity against the liberal movements by
labeling the civil society networks as leftists.1 7 This is worrisome because
the existence of North Korea has been a constant hurdle to the full
achievement of human rights protection and democracy." 8  The
authoritarian governments justified their repressive regimes by claiming
that only a strong military-style regime can fight against the threat from
North Korea.119 The ultra-rightist conservative rhetoric may suffocate the
atmosphere of freedom of expression in Korea because the devastating
effects of North Korean threats or of military tensions have never been
removed. Campaigns relying on the "red complex" used by the combatant
ultra-rightist conservatives could be very harmful for the development of
democracy, and there is evidence that Korean National Intelligence Service
agents were involved in media manipulation during the election
campaign. 12 0 In this regard, one can say that democracy in South Korea is
113 The Korean Freedom Federation (Jayuchongyeonmaeng) was first established as
Asian People's National Anti-Communist League in 1954 and has been a strong right-wing
organization that supported conservatives in Korea. For more information, see its
homepage, KOREA FREEDOM FEDERATION, http://www.koreaff.or.kr/english/president.php
(last visited Aug. 2, 2013).
114 See the homepage of the Korean War Veterans Association. KOREAN WAR VETERANS
ASSOCIATION, http://www.625war.or.kr/index.asp (last visited Aug. 2, 2013).
115 See the homepage of the Korean Marine Corps Veterans Association. KOREAN
MARINE CORPS VETERANS ASSOCIATION, http://rokmcva.kr/pwb/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2013).
116 See Yuna Han, The New Right: Political Winds in South Korea, 29 HARVARD
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW No.1 (2007).
117 Michael Richardson, Civil Society and the State in South Korea, in 2010 SAIS U.S.-
KOREA YEARBOOK 165, 166-68 (2010), available at uskoreainstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/YB07-chapterl3.pdf.
11 Many of the human rights violations in South Korea took place under the name of
national security, and the National Security Act is still not repealed because of that reason.
See generally, Diane Draft, South Korea's National Security Law: A Tool of Oppression in
an Insecure World, 24 Wis. INT'LL. J. 627 (2012).
119 See generally Tae-Ung Baik, Justice Incomplete: The Remedy for the Victims of Jeju
April Third Incident, in RETHINKING HISTORICAL INJUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN
NORTHEAST ASIA: THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE IN REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Shin et al eds.,
2007).
120 See Choe Sang-Hun, South Korean Intelligence Officers Are Accused of Political
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still in the process of growing. The struggle between the conservatives who
support authoritarian regimes and the liberals or progressives who want to
move ahead to achieve the consolidation of democracy and sound human
rights systems is not over yet.
IV. DEMANDS OF EcoNOMIC DEMOCRACY
One of the most hotly debated issues during the Presidential election in
2012 was how to achieve economic democracy in South Korea."' The
ruling party leader Park Geun-hye as well as the opposition candidates were
in agreement that the demand for economic democracy should be
considered seriously as a main point of their campaigns. However, their
actual policy to achieve the economic democracy was not the same. For
example, Park only emphasized fair competition and strict implementation
of law, while opposition party leaders were more decisively demanding the
revival of a 30% cap on the maximum amounts of investments made from
companies to their subsidiary companies.12 2  The opposition party also
demanded a ban on circular investment and a measure to cut off the ties
between financial institutions and corporations. 123 Even after the election,
Park Geun-hye is still indicating that she supports the economic democracy,
but she is now merging it with the new catchphrase "creative economy."l24
In fact these policy debates reflect the public sentiments concerning
chaebols (big conglomerates) in South Korea.
Back in 1960, South Korea was one of Asia's poorest countries, with a
Gross National Income ("GNI") per capita of $79.125 It has since grown to
be the world's 10th largest trading country with a GDP per capita of
$30,800.126 The South Korean economic miracle cannot be explained
without mentioning the growth of Korean chaebols. In Korea, chaebols are
Meddling, N.Y. TIMES (Apr 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/world/asial
south-korean-intelligence-officers-are-accused-of-political-meddling.html.
121 See Park Geun-hye's Economic Democracy Pledge Focused on Fair Market
Competition, YONHAP NEWs AGENCY (Nov 16, 2012, 12:03 PM), http://english.yonhap
news.co.kr/national/2012/11/16/98/0301000000AEN20121116004600315F.HTML.
122 Tae-Hee Lee, A Comparison of Economic Democracy Policy of Saenuri Party and
Democratic Party, THE HANKYOREH (Mar. 20, 2012 8:44 PM), http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/
politics/politics general/524374.html.
123 id.
124 Ahn Seon-hee, New President Park outlines Geun-hye-nomics, THE HANKYOREH (Feb
26, 2013, 3:25 PM), http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english-edition/e-national/575571.html.
125 YoUNG-lOB CHUNG, SOUTH KOREA IN THE FAST LANE: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
CAPITAL FORMATION 13 (2007).
126 South Korea, CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ks.html (last visited May 29, 2013) (2010 estimate in 2012 dollars).
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the whole business group as a unit consisting of a number of widely
diversified and legally independent affiliates, all of which are controlled by
a controlling shareholder, usually the founder or his heirs, and his family
members.127 For example, Samsung, Hyundai, and LG are the names of a
group of companies that have greatly diversified companies under their
wings.128
Korean corporations, especially chaebols have emerged out of favorable
conditions implemented by the government regarding capital accumulation,
financing, market management, currency control, and labor market
management, including the suppression of trade union movements.129 This
state-sponsored growth also facilitated corruption and lack of proper
corporate governance; corporate money was often used to sponsor politics
with illegal political funds and bribery.130  It was publicly known that
chaebols could get away with tax evasion and violations of fair competition
laws.' 3' In this regard, the Korean chaebol structure was criticized as being
among "the least investor-protective corporate systems in the world." 3 2
When South Korea was experiencing currency shortages during the
financial crisis in 1997-98, people rushed to donate their gold rings and
jewelry to the government to help the country overcome the crisiS.133
Housewives gave up their wedding rings; athletes donated medals and
trophies; and many gave away "gold luck keys," a traditional present on the
opening of a new business or a 60th birthday.134 With this support, the
government initiated broad reform measures to improve corporate
governance. 3 5
127 Ok-Rial Song, The Legacy of Controlling Minority Structure: A Kaleidescope of
Corporate Governance Reform in Korean Chaebol, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 183, 184-
86 (2002).
128 See generally Jiho Jang, The State Activism Toward the Big Business in Korea, 1998-
2000: Path dependence and Institutional Embeddedness, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-
COLUMBIA n. 1 (2001), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00SL9436I001/
2005/pp010423.pdf (paper prepared for delivery at the 2001 Annual Meeting of Midwest
Political Science Association, Chicago, April 19-22, 2001).
129 See Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN.
737, 737-44 (1997).
130 Id. at 742-45.
131 Id. at 742.
132 Song, supra note 127, at 183.
133 Koreans give up their gold to help their country, BBC, (Jan. 14, 1998, 6:26 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/worldlanalysis/47496.stm.
134 Id.
135 Song, supra note 127, at 220-26 (discussing corporate governance reforms); BAlK,
supra note 10, at 122-23 (discussing legislative reform recognizing human rights),
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After a decade, however, the public sentiment in Korea has shifted
again.'3 6  South Koreans started to complain that the reform efforts
following IMF-guidelines have failed to achieve the promised transparency
and global standards. 137 The reform measures ended up strengthening a
small number of chaebols, providing them increasingly greater benefits
based on their close relationship with the government, while the public was
left frustrated by the bipolarization of the industry and the unequal
distribution of economic opportunity and benefits.'3 8  The younger
generation has expressed its strong discontent, stemming from the scarcity
ofjobs and an unclear future.
Korea's economic success could be viewed in two different dimensions.
On the one hand, it was a real economic miracle: the South Korean
government even coined the term, "The Miracle on the Han River," which
was named after "The Miracle on the Rhine."3 Under the strong
leaderships of Park Chung-hee and his successors, Korea achieved rapid
economic development, while maintaining security and stability against the
constant threat from North Korea.14 0 On the other hand, the miracle was a
result of the sacrifice of workers, who worked long-hours with low wages.
The industrial injuries of workers were often overlooked and the
distribution of the fruits of the growth was not done equally.14 1  The
dominant slogans of national security and economic developmentalism
were used to justify the authoritarian regimes.142
136 See generally Bruce Klingner & Anthony B. Kim, Economic Lethargy: South Korea
Needs a Second Wave of Reforms, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 7, 2007), http:lwww.
heritage.org/research/reports/2007/12/economic-lethargy-south-korea-needs-a-second-wave-
of-reforms.
117 See Gill-Chin Lim, South Korea, Brazil and the IMF- Coping with Financial Crisis,
CENTRE FOR WORLD DIALOGUE (Summer 1999), http://www.worlddialogue.org/content
.php?id=18.
138 Lee Joo-hee, 'Economic Democratisation' buzzword of S. Korean Presidential Race,
ASIA ONE (July 6, 2012), http://www.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Asia/Story/
Al Story20120706-357497.html.
1" EuN MEE, KIM, BIG BUSINESS, STRONG STATE: COLLUSION AND CONFLICT IN SOUTH
KOREAN DEVELOPMENT 2 (1997).
140 See generally William H. Overholf, Park Chung Hee's International Legacy,
HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL ASH CENTER FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION
(2011), http://www.ash.harvard.edu/extension/ash/docs/parkjunghee.pdf.
141 See generally Hyun-Hoon Lee, Growth Policy and Inequality in Developing Asia:
Lesson from Korea, ECONOMIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR ASEAN AND EAST ASIA (2012),
available at http://www.eria.org/ERIA -DP-2012-12.pdf.
142 See MI PARK, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CHANGE: A HISTORY OF SOUTH KOREAN
STUDENT MOVEMENTS, 1980-2000 61-62 (2008).
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As the dissatisfaction of the public grew, Article 119 of the Korean
Constitution was often cited as a reference point to support the validity of
the claims. Article 119 states:
(1) The economic order of the Republic of Korea shall be based on a respect
for the freedom and creative initiative of enterprises and individuals in
economic affairs.
(2) The State may regulate and coordinate economic affairs in order to
maintain the balanced growth and stability of the national economy, to ensure
proper distribution of income, to prevent the domination of the market and the
abuse of economic power and to democratize the [national] economy through
harmony among the economic agent. 143
In other words, under this constitutional provision, the government is
obligated to pursue economic democracy. From this point of view, Korean
chaebols are again facing demands for change.
Korea is one of the most chaebol-driven economies. Currently the total
assets of thirty chaebols amount to 52% of total assets in the national
economy, 144 and Samsung's sales accounted for more than 20% of South
Korea's GDP in 2011.145 The controlling minority ownership structure of
chaebols have been widely criticized due to the lack of corporate
governance and transparency in the process of centralized management,
diversified businesses, and internal capital markets operations.146 Cross-
shareholding among branch companies is prohibited after the 1997-98
financial crisis, but circular-shareholdings is still allowed, which is one of
the greatest issues of concern.14 7 President Kim Dae-jung tried to respond
to the financial crisis with some forms of chaebol reform. 14 8 On the one
hand, he strongly reassured a system of market economy, the opening-up of
Korean markets, and the protection of foreign investment. 149 On the other
hand, he initiated chaebol reengineering drives. He met with the Hyundai,
Samsung, LG, and SK chairpersons on Jan. 3, 1998, and got them to agree
143 DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB][CONSTTUTION] art. 119 (S. Kor.) (emphasis
added).
144 See OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 171
(2001).
145 TONY MICHELL, SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP OF THE
ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY 65 (2010).
146 Song, supra note 127, at 198.
147 Id. at 198-201.
148 See generally SOOK JONG LEE, THE POLITICS OF CHAEBOL REFORM IN KOREA: SOCIAL
CLEAVAGE AND NEW FINANCIAL RULES, 38 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 439 (2008), available at
http://content.csbs.utah.edu/-mli/Economies%205430-6430/Lee-
The%20Politics%20ofo20Chaebol%20Reform%2Oin%20South%20Korea.pdf
149 Id. at 441-50.
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to the adoption of a system of combined financial statements, a prohibition
of cross-guaranteeing among branch corporations, and pledges of
investments from the owner's personal assets. 5 o He demanded so-called
"big deals" and restructuring to enhance the efficiency of the chaebols'
economy, and facilitated the reengineering of 106 companies during 1998-
2000.151 However, this process was also criticized, in that it has increased
the chaebols moral hazard because Kim helped shaky corporations with
governmental support.152 For example, to bailout Daewoo group, the
government is believed to have spent more than $100 billion USD of tax
money.15 3 In addition, to help with the restructuring, summary firing of
workers was conducted under governmental auspices, and the newly
adopted American-style flexible labor market system greatly weakened the
labor power.
Some NGOs, such as PSPD, campaigned for shareholder activism in
Korea by advocating for the participation of organized minority
shareholders in the corporate decision-making process by attending
shareholders' meetings, submitting shareholder proposals, convening
extraordinary shareholders' meetings, inspecting books and records, filing
injunctions to prevent illegal acts of management, and filing shareholder
derivative actions or criminal or administrative complaints. 5 4  The
campaign for corporate governance reform in Korea had unique meaning
because it was viewed as part of the social movements to achieve economic
justice. The government had backed up this movement to enhance the
quality of corporate governance by amending the Commercial Act, the
Securities and Exchange Act, the Securities-related Class Action Act, and
the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. Some reform measures such
as mandatory hiring of outside directors, permittance of cumulative voting,
and class actions in securities litigation had taken place as part of these
moves.15 However, the protection of minority shareholders' interests and
1so Jang, supra note 128, at 4.
151 Id.
152 See, e.g., Charles W. L. Hill, The Asian Financial Crises, BLOG OF PROF. TRAN Huu
DUNG, http://www.wright.edu/-tdung/asiancrisis-hill.htm (last visited May 30, 2013).
153 Hyunwoo Goo, Segyehwa, Sinjayujueui, geurigo Jedoronjeok Hameui: Kim Daejung
Jeongbueui Gyeongjegaehyukeul Jungsimeuro [Globalization, Neo-liberalism, and the
Institutional Implication: with a Focus on Eoconomic Reform under the Kim Daejung
Government], 6 GUKJEONGUANRI YEONGU 33, 48 (2011).
154 Jooyoung Kim & Toongi Kim, Shareholder Activism in Korea: A Review of How
PSPD Has Used Legal Measures to Strengthen Korean Corporate Governance, I J. KOREAN
L. 51, 54-55 (2001).
155 Song, supra note 127, at 186.
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promotion of the roles of shareholder deliberative actions did not
sufficiently change the corporate governance practice.156
In fact, the governmental policy toward chaebols was not very consistent.
When Hyundai Motor Group Chairman Chung Mong-koo was convicted
and sentenced to three years imprisonment on charges of embezzlement of
company funds and bribery of government officials in 2007, President Lee
Myong-bak granted him a presidential pardon in 2008, citing the
chairman's important role in the South Korean economy.1 7  Similarly,
when Lee Kun-hee, the current Samsung chairman, was sentenced by the
Korean Supreme Court to a suspended three-year prison sentence for
evading tens of millions of dollars in taxes and embezzling corporate
money in 2009, President Lee Myong-bak again granted a special amnesty
for him so that the businessman could retain his membership in the
International Olympic Committee (IOC), leading the campaign for the
South Korean city of Pyeongchang to host the 2018 Winter Olympics.158
Park Geun-hye and her ruling Saenuri Party has vowed to pursue
economic democracy by adopting some policy measures, but they refused
to restrict the pre-existing circular investment.15 9  It is not clear at all
whether the impunity of the owners of the corporations and chaebols for
their illegal acts will end during Park's presidency.
V. SOUTH KOREA'S DEATH PENALTY MORATORIUM
South Korea had been a death penalty retentionist state since its
establishment but it is now considered abolitionist in practice. 160 The death
penalty sentence has often been misused to punish political opponents of
the regimes. For example, Jo Bong-am was arrested for plotting a rebellion
against the country by forming a progressive party in 1958, and, based on
the Syngman Rhee administration's fabricated espionage charges, he was
"' Id. at 221-22.
157 S. Korea Grants Amnesty for Convicted Tycoons, AGENCY FRANCE-PRESSE-INDUSTRY
WEEK (Aug. 12, 2008), http://www.industryweek.com/regulations/south-korea-grants-
amnesty-convicted-tycoons.
158 Choe Sang-hun, Korean Leader Pardons Samsung's Ex-Chairman, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/30/business/global/30samsung.html?r-0.
15 Ryu Yi-geun, Park Geon-hye Watering Down Economic Democracy Pledges, THE
HANKYOREH (Nov. 17, 2012, 3:49 PM), http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english edition/e
national/561085.html.
160 See Kuk Cho, Death Penalty in Korea: From Unofficial Moratorium to Abolition?, 3
Asian J. Comp. L. 1 (2008). See also Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-
countries (last visited May 29, 2013).
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sentenced to death and was subsequently executed.16 1 His case was finally
retried by the Supreme Court of Korea in 2011, and he was found not
guilty.16 2  Inhyukdang, or the People's Revolutionary Party Incident is
another notorious case, where eight people were sentenced to death under
the Park Chung-hee government on April 8th, 1975 and they were executed
eighteen hours after sentencing. The Supreme Court retried the case in
2007 and found them not guilty. 6 3  Korea has executed a total of 998
convicts since its national liberation in 1945, and the last execution of
twenty-three convicts happened in 19 97 .16 After President Kim Dae-Jung
took office in 1998, South Korea's moratorium on executions began, and no
execution has happened since then. As of July 1, 2012, fifty-eight prisoners
are on death row, all of whom are males convicted of murder.16 5
The death penalty is widely supported by a majority of Asian
countries.'6 6 For example, Singapore has the highest per capita execution
rate in the world, and imposes a mandatory death penalty for murder and a
range of drugs and firearms offenses, and it asserts that capital punishment
is not a human rights issue.16 7  Malaysia retains the death penalty and
imposes the mandatory death penalty for drug trafficking.16 8 The Indian
Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty on the condition that
it is applied only to the "rarest of rare cases," 6 9 and the Japanese also
161 Andrei Lankov, Tragic End of Communist-Turned-Politician Cho Bong-am, The
Korean Times (Jan. 9, 2011), http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/01/116_7
9367.html.
162 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 08jaedol 1, Jan. 20, 2011 (S. Kor.); see also Park Si-soo, Cho
Bong-am case reopened after 51 years, KOREA TIMES (Nov. 19, 2010),
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/11/113_76660.html.
161 Families of Eight Wrongfully Executed South Korean Political Prisoners Awarded
Record Compensation, THE HANKYOREH (Aug. 22, 2007), http://english.hani.co .kr/
arti/english-edition/enational/230608.html.
164 Cho, supra note 160, at 17.
165 See Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea, 80 nyeondo ihu Sahyeongsu Hwakjeong
deung Jaryo, [Data on Death Penalty after 1980s], July 1, 2012, available at
https://www.moj.go.kr/HP/COM/bbs_03/ListShowData.do?strNbodCd=notiOO09&strWrtNo
=1654&strAnsNo=A&strRtnURL=MOJ_10301030&strOrgGbnCd=100000 (last visited
May 29, 2013); see also Kuk Cho, Death Penalty Lessons from Korea: Gradual Move from
Moratorium to Abolition, available at http://www.eui-waseda.jp/common/pdf/Prof_Cho.
pdf (last visited May 29, 2013).
166 The Death Penalty in 2012, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (last visited May 29, 2013),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/death-sentences-and-executions-in-2012.
167 Cho, supra note 160, at 7.
168 Id. at 7-8; see also Malaysia, DEATH PENALTY WORLDWIDE (last visited May 29,
2013), http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country-Malaysia
(citing Dangerous Drugs Act of Malaysia, art. 39(B), 1952, revised 1980).
169 Id. at 8; see also India Has 477 People on Death Row, BBC (Dec. 13, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-20708007.
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impose death sentences in cases of murder. 70 China's death-eligible
offences include a wide range of economic crimes such as corruption and
the theft of antiquities.171 Although China limits the death penalty to
extremely serious crimes1 72 and it is not to be applied to juveniles, 73
China's death penalty practice has been internationally criticized.17 4
Amnesty International recorded 4,000 death sentences, and 2,500
executions in China in 2001.175 According to Amnesty International, the
confirmed numbers of execution in 2007 was 470,176 1,010 in 2006,177 and
1,770 in 2005,178 which ranked number one in the world.
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights is not clear in its death
penalty norm. Article 3 provides the right to life, but there is no expression
concerning the death penalty.179  Article 5 provides the right not to be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. 1so ICCPR on the other hand, provides in Article 6(1) that no
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.'8' It further states in Article
6(2): "In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of
death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with
the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime . ... The
170 Id. at 9; see also Kawai Mikio, The Death Penalty in Japan: How Genuine is Public
Support, NIPPON.COM (March 13, 2012), http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/dOO025/
#auth_profile_0.
'7' David Lague, China Acts to Reduce High Rate of Executions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/1 1/01/world/asia/0lchina.html; see also Calum
MacLeod, Tomb Raiders Unearth New Marketplace (June 23, 2010 7:02 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-06-23-tomb-raiders-
chinaN.htm?csp=webslice.
172 Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, RefWorld (last visited May 29,
2013), http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3ae6b5cd2 (art. 48).
'7 Id. art 49.
174 Lague, supra note 171.
1s China Questions Death Penalty, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2005, 3:04 PM),
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200501/27/eng20050127_172139.html.
176 Death Sentences and Executions in 2007, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (last visited May
29, 2013), http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/death-sentences-and-executions-in-
2007.
' Death Sentences and Executions in 2006, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (last visited May
29, 2013), http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/death-sentences-and-executions-in-
2006.
178 Death Sentences and Executions in 2005, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (last visited May
29, 2013), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT50/002/2006/en/48bl2000-d451-
11 dd-8743-d3O5bea2b2c7/act5OOO22006en.html.
179 UDHR, supra note 25, art. 3.
180 Id. art. 5.
181 ICCPR, surpa note 12, art. 6(1).
182 Id. art. 6(2).
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main restriction on the death penalty is to limit the penalty to the most
serious crimes.1' Under Article 6(5), the sentence of death is prohibited
against persons below eighteen years of age and pregnant women. 184 That
is why the world has adopted the Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR
Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty in 1989, which went into
effect in 1991.'8 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has
had similar developments. Article 2.1 initially provided the right to life.'
The Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR concerning the Abolition of the Death
Penalty was signed in 1983 to abolish the death penalty, but it did not
exclude the death penalty in respect to acts committed in time of war or of
imminent threat of war.187 Protocol No. 13 to the ECHR Concerning the
Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances was finally adopted in
2002 to strengthen this move of abolishing the death penalty,'18 and no
European states are currently using the death penalty, which means that
death penalty abolition is now a regional customary norm in Europe. 89
South Korea has been moving faster than many other Asian states in its
restriction of the usage of death penalty, but it is still behind the level of
normative development in Europe. Although Korea has placed a
moratorium on executions, great numbers of crimes are still punishable by
death.' 90 Additionally, the Korean Supreme Court and Constitutional Court
support the death penalty.19' The Supreme Court considers the death
183 id
184 Id. art. 6(5).
185 See supra note 42.
186 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2.1,
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5.
187 Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty, Apr. 28, 1983, E.T.S.
114.
188 Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty, May 3, 2002, E.T.S.
187.
189 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993
(June 26, 1945) [hereinafter ICJStatute].
190 Currently, the Republic of Korea's Criminal Code punishes eighteen crimes by death:
Articles 87 (insurrection), 92(Inducement of Foreign Aggression), 93 (Taking Side with
Enemy), 94 (Benefiting Enemy by Levying Soldiers), 95 (Benefiting Enemy by Providing
Equipment), 96 (Benefiting Enemy by Destroying Equipment), 98 (Spying), 119 (Use of
Explosives), 144 (Special Obstruction of Public Duty), 163 (Obstruction of Inquest over
Unnatural Corpse), 164 (Setting Fire to Present Living Building, etc.), 172 (Burst of
Explosive Object), 173 (Obstruction to Supply of Gas, Electricity, etc.), 177 (Inundation of
Present Living Building, etc. with Water), 250 (Murder, Killing Ascendant), 324-4 (Murder
of Hostage, etc.), 338 (Murder, etc. by Robbery), and 340 (Piracy).
19' South Korea Court Rules Death Penalty Legal, BBC (Feb. 25, 2010, 12:43 PM),
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penalty constitutional as "an extremely exceptional punishment."1 92 The
Constitutional Court has also considered the constitutionality of the death
penalty twice: the first was in 1996 and the second was in 2010.'9' It also
found that the death penalty was constitutional. The majority reasons
that-"the death penalty is intended to serve several legislative purposes
including crime deterrence by making a psychological threat on the people,
bringing justice through a fair retribution against the criminals, and
protecting society by permanently blocking recidivism of the criminals,"
and that "these legislative purposes are legitimate and the death penalty is a
proper means to achieve the purposes."l 94 Four dissenting judges contend
that the death penalty violates Article 37 Section 2 of the Constitution by
infringing on the essential aspect of the right to life without any legitimate
reason"195 and "contradicts with human dignity and worth enumerated by
Article 10 of the Constitution."' 96 A positive change is that majority support
for the death penalty has decreased from seven of nine in favor of the death
penalty in 1996, to five of nine in 2010.197
Although the death penalty has not been removed, there has been some
improvement concerning the practice of death penalty norms in Korea. For
example, Article 13 of the National Security Act, a provision that allows the
death penalty to punish repeated crimes of Article 7(1) and (5) (enemy-
benefitting activities) was found unconstitutional by the Constitutional
Court in 2002'9 and Article 11(1) of the Act for Aggravated Punishments
for Specific Crimes was found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court
in 2003.199 Moreover, there have been continuous attempts to abolish the
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8536355.stm.
192 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 85Do926, June 11, 1985 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.],
87Dol240, Oct. 13, 1987, (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 92Dol086, Aug. 14, 1992, (S.
Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 94Do2662 Jan. 13, 1995, (S. Kor.); see Cho, supra note 162
at 16.
193 Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 1995Hun-Bal, Nov. 28, 1996 (S. Kor.),
Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2008Hun-ka23, Feb. 23, 2010 (S. Kor.); see also
Constitutional Court Upholds Death Penalty, THE CHOSUN ILBO (Feb. 26, 2010, 11:55 PM),
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/htmldir/2010/02/26/2010022600912.html.
194 Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2008Hun-ka23, Feb. 23, 2010 (S. Kor.).
195 See Judge Dae-hyeon Cho's dissenting opinion, Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.],
2008Hun-ka23, Feb. 23, 2010 (S. Kor.).
196 See Judge Hee-ok Kim's dissenting opinion, Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.],
2008Hun-ka23, Feb. 23, 2010 (S. Kor.).
19 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 85Do926, June 11, 1985 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.],
87Dol240, Oct. 13, 1987, (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 92Dol086, Aug. 14, 1992, (S.
Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 94Do2662 Jan. 13, 1995, (S. Kor.).
198 Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2002Hun-Ka5, Nov. 28, 2002 (S. Kor.); see Cho,
supra note 160, at 21.
199 Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2002Hun-Ba24, Nov. 27, 2003 (S. Kor.); see Cho,
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death penalty. For instance, a great number of National Assembly members
tried to abolish the penalty, and five bills have been submitted for this
purpose: 90 members (1999), 92 members (2001), 175 out of 273 total
members (2004), 39 members (2008), 53 members (2009) respectively
supported the bills to abolish the death penalty by replacing it with life
imprisonment, but none of them passed the National Assembly.200  In
addition the National Human Rights Commission presented its opinion on
April 6, 2005 that the death penalty should be abolished, 20 ' and the Catholic
Church also continues to campaign against the death penalty.20 2
Unfortunately, however, the prospects for a complete abolishment of the
death penalty are not very bright at this time. According to a poll, 69.6% of
the public still supports the death penalty203 and the new president Park
Geun-hye is a retentionist.204 The death penalty moratorium was a great
development in the process of domesticating international human rights
standards on Korea, but it still needs time to achieve a higher normative
protection of human rights under the Korean norm filtering system.
Continuous and vigorous efforts will be needed to achieve full abolition of
the death penalty.
VI. CONCLUSION
South Korea has developed its mechanisms of politics, constitutional
jurisprudence and human rights according to its own historical path. It was
indeed a miraculous process of development. South Korea can claim to
have met international standards for the most part and may be proud of its
achievements. The positive changes accomplished in Korea, however, are
not free from problems and flaws. The current status of normative
development for democracy and human rights protection reflects its
domestic political changes and norm filtering mechanisms.
The recent changes after the election process remind us of many projects
yet to be completed in the areas of political democracy, economic
supra note 162, at 21.
200 See Cho, supra note 160, at 23.
201 Id. at 24-5.
202 SANGMIN BAE, WHEN THE STATE No LONGER KILLS: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
NORMS AND ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 74 (2007).
203 See, Soon-cheol Kwon, Sahyeongje Jonsok Chanseong, 30dae Bumo Gajang Noppa
[Highest Death Penalty Retention Supports Come from the Parents in their Thirties], 995
Magazine Kyunghyang Weekly (Oct. 9, 2012), http://newsmaker.khan.co.kr/khnm.html?
mode-view&code=1 13&artid=201209251353171 &pt-nv.
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democracy and further protection of human rights. South Korea still has
miles to go to consolidate its democracy and human rights systems. This
change will not be given for free. To achieve this goal, more efforts from
various stakeholders in South Korean society should be exerted.

